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Abstract 
We present control patterns: a framework for designing and analyzing inter-
organizational control mechanisms, inspired by design patterns. A control pattern is a 
generic solution for some recurring control problem, applicable in a certain context. The 
patterns are based on internal control theory from the accounting and auditing fields, 
and on previous work on inter-organizational controls.  The application of the patterns is 
supported by the e3-control methodology, which is based on the e3-value business 
modeling tool. The patterns are applied in a case study.  
1. Introduction 
In e-commerce, enterprises increasingly organize themselves as value constellations: a 
collection of enterprises that cooperate to satisfy a consumer need, each utilizing their 
own specific expertise, products, and services (Sarkar et al 1998; Timmers 1998; Tapscott 
2000).  One of the prerequisites for cooperation is that participants must trust each other 
not to behave opportunistically, i.e. default on their agreements. Opportunistic behavior 
also exists in a single enterprise, for instance when an employee commits fraud. 
Typically, such behavior is addressed by organization controls: measures to prevent, 
detect or correct opportunistic behavior (Starreveld et al 1994; Ronmey and Steinbart 
2003). In a single enterprise, opportunistic behavior and the design of controls can be 
addressed by a single decision authority in a hierarchical way. This is impossible in a 
value constellation, because individual enterprises keep decision authority to themselves. 
Consequently, in value constellations different types of controls have to be developed, 
and designing controls becomes more like a negotiation process between equals, than 
following directives from an authority. 
This paper presents a methodology for the analysis and design of inter-organizational 
control mechanisms for value constellations. The approach is based on e3-control 
(Kartseva et al 2005b), which is a value-based modeling approach for the analysis and 
design of inter-organizational controls. Please note that e3-control itself is based on the e3-
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value methodology for the analysis and design of value constellations (Gordijn and 
Akkermans 2001; 2003). 
There are several reasons for using a value-based modeling approach. First, the value 
perspective is conceptually close to Transaction Cost Economics, which studies 
safeguards against opportunistic behavior in contract relationships (Williamson 1979).  
Because the e3-value and  e3-control methods can handle value, they are capable of 
making a cost-benefit analysis of control mechanisms. This involves a risk assessment, 
which is typically part of auditing practice. Second, control mechanisms are themselves 
services, with an additional price tag. That raises questions like: who is going to pay for a 
control mechanism, who is going to execute it, and how will it affect the business models 
of the parties involved?  These questions are not particularly relevant from an internal 
control perspective, but in a value constellation controls may affect the profitability of 
participants, or may even lead to new business opportunities. Examples of inter-
organizational control mechanisms that are offered as separate commercial services, are 
Escrow services (Hu et al 2004), and the Letter of Credit Procedure (ICC 1993). Third, 
many controls themselves have inherent value-aspects. For instance, a Letter of Credit is 
a control document that may also be traded and re-sold. As far as we know, the value 
modeling approach has neither been applied in internal control, nor in inter-organizational 
control.  
We organize existing domain knowledge about inter-organizational controls by so called 
design patterns. Design patterns have been invented in architecture (Alexander 1979) and 
have been successfully applied in computer science (Gamma et al 1995) to reuse design 
knowledge for the construction of information systems. In general, a design pattern is a 
description of a general and accepted solution for some recurring problem, which is 
applicable in a certain context. We call our patterns control patterns. Until now, e3-
control has focused on constructs to model and conceptualize inter-organizational 
controls. Practitioners also need guidelines how to construct such models. The 
contribution of this paper is therefore to present accepted knowledge about inter-
organizational controls for value constellations in a systematic way, by means of control 
patterns. 
The domain knowledge in this paper comes in the first place from accounting and 
auditing theory (Starreveld et al 1994; Ronmey and Steinbart 2003, Schaad 2003). Well 
known principles are segregation of duties and conflict of interest.  Other domain 
knowledge is taken from ongoing research on inter-organizational controls (e.g. Bons 
1997; Lee et al 1998; Bons et al 2000; Weigand and de Moor 2003). Much of this work is 
based on the assumption that principles of internal accounting and auditing theory may be 
applicable to inter-organizational settings too, provided that the assumptions about the 
context in which such principles are applied, are made clear. A third source of domain 
knowledge is formed by a number of  recent case studies in the fields of internet radio, 
renewable energy, international trade, and health care  (Kartseva et al 2005a; Kartseva et 
al 2005b; Kartseva and Tan 2005).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide some background 
on control patterns. In section 3, we study a number of particular control patterns from 
international trade.  In section 4 we apply the patterns to a case study of an Escrow 
service.  
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2. Control Patterns 
2.1 Patterns 
Our proposal to use control patterns, is inspired by the use of design patterns in 
architecture (Alexander 1979), and especially in software development (Gamma et al 
1995). A design pattern is a description of a general accepted solution for some recurrent 
problem, which is applicable in a certain context (Gamma et al 1995). Patterns are 
applied as follows: to solve a problem, a solution is selected, provided a number of 
constraints on the context hold. This selection process can be described by the following 
type of IF-THEN rules: 
IF problem P AND context C, THEN solution S 
 
To apply patterns in inter-organization control, we first have to define what the problems, 
solutions and context are in the case of controls: 
Definition 1.  A control pattern is a generic and re-usable control mechanism for a 
recurring control problem, selected on the basis of aspects of the context of application. 
The structure of a control pattern is the following: 
1. context: a description of the value constellation to be controlled, modeled from an 
ideal perspective, meaning that no one behaves opportunistically. 
2. problem:  a statement of one or more the control problems, illustrated by 
scenarios that demonstrate a risk for opportunistic behavior,  represented by a 
sub-ideal value model and a process model for the value constellation. 
3. solution: a control mechanism, described by guidelines and illustrations of their 
implementation in process models and value models. A solution may have 
different variations, along with forces, which are conditions to select these 
variations.  
 
The context should provide a background to the control-problem and its solutions. The 
context explains what is considered to be the norm. Controls should prevent, detect or 
correct any behavior not allowed by this norm. To describe this normative ideal behavior, 
we state the enterprises and what economic value they should exchange. A control 
problem exists if there is some deviation of the prescribed exchange of economic value, 
e.g. the wrong products are delivered, or no products are delivered at all. Therefore we 
model the context by ideal value models (see section 0). 
The problem consists of one or more control problems. Following the accounting 
literature, a control problem is defined by one or more risks. Typically, a risk for 
opportunistic behavior is illustrated by one or more scenarios that display a violation of 
the ideal model. Fraudulous or undesired behavior can be represented by a sub-ideal 
value model. This is a value model that explicitly records potential violations, from a 
value perspective (see section 0).  To understand a control problem, and to select 
appropriate solutions, we have to understand the inter-organizational business processes 
associated with a sub-ideal value model. To represent process models we use UML 
activity diagrams (see section 0).  For each domain, we need a vocabulary of operational 
activities. Section 3.4 contains a vocabulary for inter-organizational settings.  
The solution describes a control mechanism, which prevents, detects, or corrects the 
control problem. In case a solution fully solves the control problem, it can be specified by 
means of an ideal value model plus an activity diagram that shows how the control 
mechanism works. Given the context and problem descriptions, different ways of 
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implementing a solution are possible. For design patterns, such alternatives are known as 
variations. The reasons that determine which variation of a solution must be 
implemented, is called a force. Forces are constraints on the context of application. In the 
case study variations prove to be useful: they can express differences, which are not 
crucial enough to warrant a separate pattern. In that case the selection process is described 
by the following IF-THEN rules: 
 IF problem P AND context C AND force F,        
 THEN solution S, with variation V 
Control patterns can be used  both for analyzing and designing processes. In analysis, 
they highlight risks, and identify possible solutions. In (re)-design, they explicitly guide 
the construction of a new organizational set up or business process. Below, we briefly 
review the notation for expressing control patterns. 
2.2 Ideal Value Models: e3-value 
The e3-value methodology provides modeling concepts, to represent which parties in a 
value constellation, exchange which objects of economic value with which other parties 
(Gordijn and Akkermans 2003).  Figure 1 shows an example, of a buyer who obtains 
goods from a seller and offers a payment in return. According to the law, the seller is 
obliged to pay value-added tax (VAT). This can be conceptualized with the following e3-
value constructs (in bold). Actors, such as the buyer, seller, and the tax office are 
economically independent entities. Actors transfer value objects (payment, goods, VAT) 
by means of value exchanges. For value objects, some actor should be willing to pay, 
which is shown by a value interface. A value interface models the principle of economic 
reciprocity: only if you pay, you can obtain the goods and vice versa. A value interface 
consists of value ports, which represent that value objects are offered to and requested 
from the actor’s environment. Actors may have a consumer need, which, following a 
path of dependencies, will result in the exchange of value objects. Exchanges may lead 
to other exchanges by the same actor, as in the case of the seller, or lead to a boundary 
element.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of an e3-value model of a purchase with payment of tax 
2.3 Sub-Ideal Value Models: e3-Control 
In e3-value, it is assumed that actors behave in an ideal way, meaning that all value 
exchanges occur as prescribed. This implies, amongst other things, that actors respect the 
principle of economic reciprocity. In reality, actors may not behave as stated in an e3-
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value model; they can commit fraud or make unintentional errors.  In e3-control, which 
has been suggested as an extension of e3-value (Kartseva et al. 2005b), these situations 
are modeled by sub-ideal value exchanges. These are graphically represented by a 
dashed line, which indicates the possibility of different risks, e.g. that actors will not pay 
for the goods, not obtain the goods, or obtain the wrong goods.   
2.4 Process Models   
Control problems and control mechanisms often involve operational activities; not just 
value exchanges. Take for example the verification of an activity, or the transfer of an 
evidence document. The temporal order in which activities take place, forms a crucial 
part of controls (Chen 1992). So we need a graphical notation to represent the operational 
aspects of control problems and solutions. For this purpose we use UML-activity 
diagrams (Rumbaugh et al. 1999).  
3. Inter-organizational Control Patterns 
3.1 Internal control 
Our inter-organizational control patterns are inspired by principles from the accounting 
and auditing fields (Starreveld 1994, Romney and Steinbart, Schaad 2003). Examples of 
internal control principles are segregation of duties, decentralization and supervision and 
review (Schaad 2003). Segregation of duties means that a critical transaction must be 
divided into at least two separate activities, performed by different actors. 
Decentralization means that one person cannot manage all activities; some activities must 
be delegated to subordinates. When activities are delegated, the supervision and review 
principle applies. This requires that all activities are reviewed post hoc by another person.  
The internal control field provides rich and validated knowledge of risks and control 
mechanisms, but only in the scope of a hierarchical organization. It has been argued that 
these mechanisms can be approximated for inter-organizational settings too (Bons 1997). 
Extending the set of inter-organizational controls is one of the goals of our research. 
However, in this paper, we follow the practice in design patterns, to re-organize validated 
knowledge about solutions, rather than invent new solutions.   
3.2 Trust 
Trust plays a defining role in the analysis and design of inter-organizational controls. 
Parties in a business transaction may not trust each other, and be vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior. That means that when parties invest in a transaction, they are 
uncertain whether the other party will perform their part of the deal.   In Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) this type of opportunistic behavior is referred to as ‘ex-post’ 
opportunism (Williamson 1979).  It has been argued that such uncertainty can be reduced 
by supporting a business transaction with documents that provide a form of control, 
which is referred to as documentary control.  Along a similar line, Bons (1997) argues 
that the exchange of evidence documents can reduce the risk of non-performance as it 
decreases the uncertainty of the parties involved.  
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3.3 Evidence Function and Preventative Function 
We start from work on inter-organizational control mechanisms developed by Lee and 
Bons in various publications (Lee and Bons 1996; Bons 1997; Lee et al 1998).  Their aim 
was to develop a set of re-usable trusted trade procedures for electronic data interchange 
(EDI). The control principles are validated with case studies from international trade, in 
particular the Letter of Credit procedure. In designing controls, Lee and Bons identify a 
primary activity performed by a primary actor, and a counter activity by a counter actor, 
that must be performed in return.  The primary actor does not trust the counter actor; i.e. 
is expecting a risk. The risk is a situation in which, because of fraud or unintentional 
errors, the counter activity is executed inappropriately or not at all, while the primary 
activity has been executed.  
Inter-organizational documentary controls have two objectives: a preventative function 
and an evidence function. The evidence function means that the party responsible for the 
performance of some activity should receive evidence of the activity being executed. This 
results in the following principle of Bons1: 
General principle 1: If a primary activity is performed by Role1, Role2 should 
testify the completion thereof using some document, which should be received by 
Role1. If the party playing Role2 is not trusted by the party playing Role1, the 
primary activity should be executed after receiving the document. (Bons 1997; p 
.60) 
The preventative function means that before an actor executes an activity, for which some 
counter activity has to be performed by another actor, it should be certain about the 
performance of the counter activity.   
General principle II: Before Role1 executes a primary activity, it should have 
witnessed the performance of the counter activity by some Role2, if the party 
playing Role1 does not trust the party responsible for Role2, unless it has 
received evidence that Role 2 has executed its tasks.  (Bons 1997; p .61) 
If such witnessing is impossible and the reliability of the evidence is questionable, a 
trusted third party may be involved: 
General principle III: If Role1 cannot witness the performance of a counter 
activity, another Role3 should testify the completion of Role2’s activity, if the 
party playing Role2 is not trusted by the party playing Role1. This document must 
be received by Role1 before the execution of its primary activity, and the party 
playing Role 3 should be trusted by the party playing Role 1. (Bons 1997; p .61) 
In addition, for the preventative function two other principles are defined, which deal 
with situations when some activities are delegated to other agents.  
Note that these control principles also incorporate internal control principles (see section 
3.1). For example, a requirement that witnessing an activity is done by a party different 
from a party that executes the activity is an instance of the segregation of duty principle. 
3.4 Vocabulary  
The patterns are formulated in a general way, using variables for the actors and activities. 
We use the following vocabulary, roughly based on Bons’ terminology (Figure 3).  There 
are two actors: a primary actor (A1) and a counter actor.(A2) The primary actor must 
perform a primary activity (PA), by means of transferring a value object, called 
                                                     
1 To remain consistent with e3 -value terminology, in the rest of the paper we will use the term 
‘actor’ instead of Bons’s phrase ‘Role’ or ‘party playing Role’.    
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primary object (PO) to the counter actor. The counter actor must execute a counter 
activity (CA), by means of transferring a value object called counter object (CO), to the 
primary actor. The transfer of a value object is represented by an operational activity, 
called execute, performed by the actor with the outgoing value port.    
The control activities that are considered in this paper are limited to witnessing, or 
verification as it is called in the remainder of this paper to remain consistent with 
accounting terminology, and the exchange of evidence documents (Doc). A verification 
activity can only be performed by an actor who has access to the (results of the) activity 
that is verified.  In case evidence is needed from a distance, another actor should testify. 
By definition, any activity that produces an evidence document, is called testify in this 
paper.   
 
Value perspective Process perspective 
 
A1 A2
execute
PA
execute
CA
 
A1 A2
execute
PA
execute
CA
 
 
Figure 2: Value exchange between primary actor (A1) and counter actor (A2), with two 
possible process models   
 
3.5 Patterns of Inter-organizational Control  
Based on an overview of the accounting and auditing literature, we have developed a set 
of control patterns. Figure 3 contains the list of the current control patterns in our 
collection. Two patterns, `Pre-execution’ and `Receipt’, which are based on the principles 
of Bons described above, will be presented in more detail and applied in a case study.  
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Pattern Description 
pre-execution require verification of counter activity before executing 
primary activity 
receipt require evidence of execution of primary activity from counter 
actor 
post verification require verification of counter activity after execution of 
counter activity 
verification verify correctness and completeness of the results of an 
activity, against given standards 
commitment 
confirmation 
require confirmation of commitment from counter actor 
before executing primary activity 
commitment 
authorisation 
require authorization to make commitment before accepting 
conformation of commitment 
compensation in case of sub-ideal exchanges, require compensation from the 
responsible actors  
Figure 3: Collection of Patterns for Inter-Organizational Control 
 
As defined in section 2, a pattern consists of a name, a context, a control problem, and a 
one or more variations of the solution (control mechanisms), with the corresponding 
forces, i.e. conditions to select a specific variation.   
3.6 Pattern ‘Pre-execution’ 
This pattern corresponds to the preventative function of documentary controls, and covers 
General Principle II and III of Bons (1997).   
Context:  A1 and A2 are about to engage in a transaction. According to contract, A1 
must Execute PA and A2 must Execute CA.    
Control problem: A1 does not trust A2, because of the risk that A2 may not properly 
execute CA, after having executed PA.  This can be caused by fraud or unintentional 
error. For example, after having paid, a buyer may not receive the goods from the seller.  
Control mechanism:  
Force a. A1 is able to verify the execution of CA.  
Variation a.  Require that CA is executed before PA, and introduce a verification activity 
to check this.  For example, the buyer inspects the goods, before payment.  
Force b. A1 is not able to verify the execution of CA, or variation a is not acceptable to 
A2 (dead lock).  
Variation b.  Require an evidence document (Doc) of execution of CA, or of 
preparations for executing CA, before executing PA. This evidence can be obtained from 
a trusted third party (TTP).  In that case, the value model must also be changed.  
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 Value perspective Process perspective 
Context 
 
 
Problem 
 
A1 A2
execute
PA
 
Solution a: CA before PA 
PA
execute
A1 A2
execute
CAverify
 
 b Evidence of CA before 
PA 
 
PA
execute
Doc
A1 A2
CA
execute
TTP
testify
verify
 
 
Figure 4: Pattern ‘Pre-execution’ 
3.7 Pattern ‘Receipt’ 
This pattern corresponds to the evidence function of documentary controls. It is based on 
General Principle I of Bons (1997).  
Context: A1 and A2 are about to engage in a transaction. According to contract, A1 must 
Execute PA, and A2 must Execute CA.    
Control problem: A1 does not trust A2. A1 runs the risk that if he cannot prove having 
executed PA, A2 might behave opportunistically, by claiming that A1 did not execute PA 
and subsequently cancel CA, or claim reimbursement of CA.  
Control mechanism: A1 requires an evidence document (Doc) from A2 that testifies 
execution of the primary activity. In Figure 5, the empty activity is a placeholder that can 
be replaced by any activity of A1, or a trusted party.  
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 Value perspective Process perspective 
Context 
 
 
Problem 
 
A1 A2
execute
PA PA
non−exec
claim
 
Solution Evidence of execution of 
PA 
execute
PA
Doc
A1
testify
PA
A2
 
Figure 5: Pattern ‘Receipt’ 
 
4. Case Study: International Trade  
An Escrow service is an inter-organizational control mechanism, to guarantee payment 
for a transaction. Escrow services can be delivered by a notary or a bank, but specific 
Escrow services exist for international trade, and electronic commerce. For more about 
the use of Escrow services on electronic markets, see Hu et al (2004).  
In a typical scenario, buyer and seller have made some agreement about a transaction, and 
have also made an agreement about using and paying for the Escrow service. Now the 
buyer first transfers money to the Escrow provider. Once the payment is verified, the 
Escrow provider notifies the seller to ship the goods. The Escrow provider verifies 
whether the goods reach their destination, using tracking information provided by the 
carrier. After delivery, the buyer has a limited period of time to inspect the goods and 
accept the delivery. If the buyer accepts the goods, or waits beyond the deadline, the 
money is transferred to the seller. If the goods never arrive, or are returned by the buyer, 
the money is reimbursed to the buyer, with shipping costs deducted.  Escrow providers 
may charge anywhere from 2% - 15% of the purchase price for their services.  
Using an Escrow service reduces the risk for both seller and buyer. The buyer may 
distrust the seller’s willingness to deliver the goods that were agreed on. Therefore the 
buyer can inspect the goods and return them. The seller may distrust the ability of the 
buyer to pay. Therefore the Escrow provider verifies the payment before shipping. The 
Escrow provider also maintains a maximum period for the buyer to return the goods; after 
this period the seller will get the money anyway.  In case of a conflict, the Escrow 
provider may mediate between the parties.  
We are now going to construct a version of an Escrow service, using the patterns 
described in Section 3. Each step in the derivation starts from a description of a specific 
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element of the context, which involves a control problem, caused by the distrust between 
the buyer and the seller. By applying a pattern, the situation is altered to avoid the control 
problem. Because not all issues can be addressed at the same time, patterns will have to 
be applied iteratively. 
4.1 Step 1: General Context Description 
A buyer and a seller have made an agreement about a transaction, which involves 
shipment of goods over a distance, in return for a sum of money. Buyer and seller do not 
know, and do not trust each other. The seller delegates shipping to a trusted carrier.  
Figure 5 shows an ideal value model that represents the context. Buyer and seller 
exchange value objects Fee and Goods.  The seller delegates Transportation carrier, in 
return for a Transportation Fee. The exchange of these value objects corresponds to the 
execution of the operational activities `pay goods’, `ship goods’, `pay transport’ and 
`deliver goods’.  At this stage buyer and seller have not agreed on a temporal order of 
these activities, which is why we do not show the activity diagram.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Initial value model with operational activities 
4.2 Step 2: General Control Problem Description 
Now we look at possible risks in this ideal model. Every business exchange can have 
multiple risks. We consider only the types of risks that were discussed in the theory 
section. Each risk is modeled with a sub-ideal exchange in the value model in Figure 6. 
As is customary in e3-control, the actor that is to blame for a sub-ideal exchange is 
labeled with a P (for penalty) and a number. First, we consider the risk that the buyer paid 
for the goods, but did not receive them (P1). This is a risk caused by opportunistic 
behavior of the seller. The other two risks are caused by opportunistic behavior of the 
buyer. The second risk is that the buyer will not pay (P2). The third risk is that the buyer 
can claim that the wrong goods were delivered, claim reimbursement (P3). 
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Figure 6: Sub-ideal value model, with four risks  
 
4.3 Step 3. Control Mechanism Design 
Risk P1: buyer does not trust seller about delivery   
Control problem:  After the buyer paid, the seller may not deliver the goods, or the 
wrong goods.  
Trust relations: The buyer does not trust the seller or the carrier.  
Pattern: Pre-execution 
Assignment of variables:  A1 = buyer, A2 = seller, PA = pay goods, CA = deliver goods 
Control mechanism: The buyer requires (evidence of) delivery of the goods, before 
payment.   
Forces:  The buyer is able to verify the delivery. Apply variation a.   
Application:  In the process model (Figure 5) we add activity ‘verify’ for the buyer. 
Verification should be performed by an actor different from the seller. It cannot be 
assigned to the carrier, because the carrier is not trusted by the buyer. The value model 
remains unchanged, except that the operational activity ‘verify’ is added to the buyer. 
 
 
Figure 7: Process model after designing controls to prevent risk P1 
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Risk P2: seller does not trust buyer about payment 
Control problem: After the seller delivered the goods, the buyer may not pay.  
Trust relations: The seller does not trust the buyer; the seller trusts the carrier. 
Pattern: Pre-execution 
Assignment of variables:  A1 = seller, A2 = buyer, PA = deliver goods, CA = pay 
goods. 
Control mechanism: The seller requires (evidence of) payment, before shipping the 
goods.  
Forces:  The seller is able to verify payment. Apply variation a.  This requires that 
‘deliver goods’ is executed after ‘pay goods’. That leads to a deadlock because the control 
mechanism against risk P1 prohibits this order. So other options need to be tried.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Process model after designing controls to prevent risk P2 
 
We add a trusted third party: the Escrow.  To avoid the deadlock we split the original 
‘pay goods’ into two activities: ‘down pay’, from buyer to Escrow, and ‘pay out’ from 
Escrow to seller.  Now we apply pattern pre-execution, variation b.  
Assignment of variables:  A1 = seller, A2 = buyer, TTP = Escrow, PA = deliver goods, 
CA = down pay.  
Application: The Escrow provides evidence to the seller of the down payment. This 
mitigates risk P2 of the seller (Figure 8) 
The split means that the buyer has delegated to the Escrow paying out the money. 
Payment still only occurs after the buyer has verified the delivery of the goods. This 
mitigates risk P1 of the buyer, as before.  
In the value model an Escrow actor is added, who delivers the ‘Escrow_service’ in return 
for an ‘Escrow_Fee’ (see Figure 9).   If both parties pay part of the fee, an additional 
value exchange would have to be added between Escrow and seller. The added 
operational activities are shown in white. 
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Figure 9: Value model after designing controls to prevent risk P2 
 
Risk P3: seller does not trust buyer about receiving the goods 
Control problem: After delivery, the buyer may claim that the goods were not delivered, 
and may delay pay out by failing to verify delivery  
Trust relations: The seller does not trust the buyer. The seller trusts the carrier. 
Pattern: Receipt 
Assignment of variables:  A1 = seller, A2 = buyer, PA = deliver goods, CA = ‘verify’ 
leading to ‘pay out’.  
Control mechanism: The seller requires an evidence document from the buyer  
testifying that the goods were delivered, immediately after delivery.  
Application: Add a ‘testify’ activity from the buyer to the carrier (and therefore also to 
the seller), occurring immediately after delivery of the goods.  There is a risk that the 
buyer may not provide this evidence document, because it goes against his own interests. 
After all, the buyer has not had access yet to the goods. Therefore, we can let the carrier 
make sure that a receipt is signed, before handing over the goods. In fact, this means that 
the activity ‘deliver goods’ is split up into two separate activities: ‘arrival of goods’, 
meaning that the goods arrive at the location of the buyer, and ‘hand over goods’, 
meaning that the goods are put into the custody of the buyer, followed by another 
application of the Pre-execution pattern (CA = testify, PA = hand over goods). Note that 
the buyer can testify arrival, but can only verify whether the right goods were sent after a 
longer inspection period (see below). 
On the value level, the model remains the same as in Figure 9, except for adding ‘testify 
arrival’ to the buyer, and replacing ‘deliver goods’ by ‘arrival goods’ and ‘hand over 
goods’, for the carrier.  
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Figure 10: Process model after designing the controls to prevent risk P3 
Further Risks 
Often buyers have a right to return the goods, in case they are not satisfied.  In that case, 
the Escrow must reimburse the payment. This could be modeled as another control 
pattern, to address the risk of the buyer that the wrong goods were delivered (similar to 
P1). But to protect the seller, the Escrow will then typically limit the duration of the 
inspection period during which goods may be returned. The application of the `Receipt’ 
pattern above, creates evidence to mark the beginning of this period. If the period expires, 
the Escrow will execute ‘pay out’ anyway. After such extensions we arrive exactly at the 
Escrow service, as described at the beginning of the section. It shows that the design of an 
inter-organizational control mechanism is often a negotiation process.  
Further control problems arise, when the strategic effects of time and money are taken 
into account. For example, in the current version, the buyer has to pay up front. In case 
the delivery takes a long time, this may be a risk for the buyer. For that reason, credit 
facilities may be added. In that case, the initial deposit (down pay) is financed by a credit 
from a bank.  Adding a credit facility, with proper guarantees, would produce a form of 
the Letter of Credit procedure (Bons 1997; ICC 1993).  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we introduce a framework for applying control patterns. A control pattern is 
a generic and re-usable solution for a recurring control problem, selected on the basis of 
aspects of the context of application. The approach is inspired by the use of design 
patterns in software engineering. Design patterns must be based on well-established 
knowledge. Hence, we took the well-established internal control theory, and in particular 
the more inter-organisational interpretation of Bons thereof, as the theoretical basis for 
our control patterns.     
The control patterns employ value models to describe the impact of a redesign on the 
structure of a value constellation. This value perspective is conceptually close to 
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Transaction Cost Economics, which traditionally deals with measures against 
opportunistic behaviour. The value perspective enables a cost-benefit analysis of control 
mechanisms, including a limited form of risk analysis. Finally, in inter-organizational 
settings control mechanisms often appear as separate commercial services, altering the 
value constellation.   
An interesting additional contribution of this paper is the way we combine the value 
activities of e3-control, with operational activities in regular UML activity diagrams.  
A case study of an Escrow service illustrates how the patterns can be applied. An Escrow 
service is a way of overcoming the distrust between parties, who both require evidence of 
the other party’s activity, before executing their own. From a control perspective, an 
Escrow service is a simplified Letter of Credit procedure, namely without a credit facility. 
This is in line with previous case study research. 
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